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CASES NOTED
CONFLICT OF LAWS-RIGHT OF INHERITANCE OF DESCENDANTS
OF ADOPTED CHILD
Appellant's mother was formerly adopted in Texas and reared in California
by the intestate and her husband, the adopting parents. The intestate, the
surviving adoptive parent, died domiciled in California, and was predeceased
by appellant's mother. At the time of the adoption the adopting parents signed
a document reciting that the adopted girl should henceforth enjoy all "rights
and privileges as if born to us." In the lower court there was an order revoking
letters of administration of the intestate estate, previously issued to the appellant. Held, on appeal, that the Texas adoption, which bestowed the status
of legal heir on appellant, did not give her the capacity to take; however, the
document constituted a continuing offer to adopt, which appellant's mother had
accepted by continuing to live with the adopting parents in California, thus
creating a valid contract. Appellant, as a lineal descendant of the intestate, is
entitled to letters of administration of her estate. Order reversed. In re Grace's
Estate, 200 P.2d 189 (Cal. App. 1948).
The status acquired by adoption in one state will be recognized in another
state which has statutory provision for adoption.' Since each state follows its
own laws of inheritance as to realty within its borders and the personalty of its
domiciliaries, 2 the court correctly stated that Texas law should be determinative
of appellant's capacitv-California law of her right-to inherit. Its application
of these rules to the facts seems open to criticism. Under the law of Texas 3
adoption entitled the person adopted only the rights and privileges of a legal
heir, rather than those of a natural child I and such a legal heir could pass none
of his inheritance rights to his descendants. 6 But California law does allow
1. Finley v. Brown, 122 Tenn. 316, 123 S. W. 359 (1909) ; Ross v. Ross, 129 Mass. 243,

37 Am. Rep. 321 (1880) ; Appeal of Woodward, 81 Conn. 152, 70 Atl. 453 (1908) (an
adoption legally made is not terminated by a change in domicile); see Mott v. First
National Bank, 98 Fla. 444, 124 So. 36 (1929). But see Brown v. Finley, 157 Ala. 424, 425,
47 So. 577, 578 (1908). RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 143 (1934).
2. Hood v. McGehee, 237 U. S. 611 (1915) ; Calhoun v. Bryant, 28 S. D. 266, 133

N. W. 266 (1911) ; Finley v. Brown, supra.

RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS

§§ 247,

305, comment b (1934).
3. "Article 1. Any person wishing to adopt another as his legal heir may do so by
filing . . . a statement in writing . .. (reciting], in substance, that he adopts the person

named therein as his legal heir .... "
"Article 2. Such statement in writing

shall entitle the party so adopted to all the
rights and privileges, both in law and equity, of a legal heir of the party so adopting
him .. " Acts OF TEXAs (1850), c. 39, P. 1. 30, 31 (this act has since been repealed).
4. Cochran v. Cochran, 43 Tex, Civ. App. 259, 95 S. W. 731 (1906); see Bell v.
Thomsen, 116 Tex. 325, 273 S. W. 1109 (1925) ; Hoch v. Hoch, 162 S. W.2d 433 (Tex.
App. 1942).
5. State v. Yturria, 109 Tex. 220, 204 S. W. 315 (1918) ; Harle v. Harle, 109 Tex.

214, 204 S. W. 317 (1918).

CASES NOTED
descendants of adopted children to inherit from the adopting parents, making
no distinction between adopted and natural children in such matters.6 The
court reasoned that Texas gave appellant's mother the status of legal heir,
citing several Texas decisions 7 to support its finding. These cases involved
the question of inheritance rights of parties adopted in Texas as to property
in which Texas law determined the right to inherit. Having already determined
that appellant's mother had been legally adopted under Texas law, the court
should not have considered itself bound by decisions, as here California law
determines the right to inherit.
The court also relied on Shaver v. Nash.8 In that case one adopted under
the Texas statute 9 later moved to Arkansas and there claimed the enlarged
inheritance rights granted by that state to those adopted under its own law.
The court held that Texas law governed both his status as an adopted child
and his right to inherit. However, most jurisdictions differentiate between the
status created by the act of adoption, and the separate and incidental inheritance
rights emanating from this status.'9 Since this court professes to follow the
majority view, reliance on the Shaver case appears erroneous.
There would seem to be no such status as that of a partially adopted child;
a child is either adopted or not. Furthermore, the law of inheritance is a mere
incident to adoption without signficance outside the state of its enactment."'
The contract theory propounded by the California court appears to have
been unnecessary. The decision did not have to rest solely on a few words
fortuitously incorporated into the adoption agreement.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-RIGHT OF
STATE TO PROHIBIT UNION SECURITY CONTRACTS
Defendants were convicted by a North Carolina court for violating a
state statute I making it illegal to discriminate against union or non-union men
6. In re Smith's Estate, 73 Cal. App. 2d 291, 166 P.2d 74 (1946) ; In re Estate of

Hebert, 42 Cal. App. 2d 664, 109 P.2d 729 (1941) ; In re Moore's Estate, 47 P.2d 533 (Cal.
Civ. App. 1942).
7. See notes 4 and 5 supra.
8. 181 Ark. 1112, 29 S. W.2d 298 (1930).
9. See note 3 supra.
10. In re Riemann's Estate, 124 Kan. 539, 262 P. 16 (1927) ; Anderson v. French,
77 N. H. 509, 93 Ati. 1042 (1915) (overruling in effect, though not expressly, Meader v.
Archer, 65 N. H. 214, 23 Atl. 521 (1889) ; GoooarCi, CONFIc'S OF LAWS 384 (2d ed.
1938). Contra: Meader v. Archer, supra; In re Sunderland's Estate, 60 Iowa 732, 13

N. W. 655 (1883).
11. In re Riemann's Estate, supra (where the Kansas Court expressly reversed its
prior position) ; Calhoun v. Bryant, supra.
1. N. C. Laws 1947, c. 328 § 2 ("Anv agreement or combination between any employer and any labor union or labor organization whereby persons not members of such
union or organization shall be denied the right to whrk for said employer, or whereby
such membership is made a condition of employment or continuation of employment by
such employer or whereby any union or organization acquires an employment monopoly

